Though the U.S. economy is generally open with respect to international trade in services, there are some notable exceptions as well as some more subtle problems. This essay provides a brief primer on trade in services, examines recent world and U.S. data, and highlights the major trade barriers, the opportunities, and the policy dangers that lurk in the current political climate.
1 Since this essay focuses on the U.S., "foreign" corporations will mean those companies that are headquartered outside of the U.S., while "domestic" or "U.S." corporations will mean those companies that are headquartered in the U.S.
II. Trade in Services --A Primer
Services are usually not the first thing that most people visualize when they think of international trade. Instead, it is trade in goods --represented by sacks of grain, rolls of steel, barrels of oil, boxes of toys and electronic goods, etc. --that is most readily visualized and that is often the subject of newspaper stories about trade and of policy debates about trade. This is probably to be expected. Goods are concrete; their movement can be physically tracked as they cross borders from one country to another. Their concreteness helps in documentation and data gathering, as well as in understanding trade impediments such as tariffs and quotas.
By contrast, services are intangible; they can't be seen, touched, held, or felt. It is no accident that international flows of services used to be described as "invisibles". They flow internationally in different ways than do goods, so that the standard trade impediments (tariffs and quotas) usually don't apply. Also, services are more likely to be subject to direct domestic regulation of their delivery, which then opens opportunities for more subtle (or, perhaps, not so subtle) trade restrictive efforts through this regulation. In recognition of these differences, the inception of the World Trade Organization (WTO), as the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1995, brought with it a separate document and negotiating forum (under the umbrella of the WTO): the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
These differences, and the likely lesser general familiarity with trade in services, make a brief discussion of the basics of trade in services worthwhile.
A. The four modes of trade in services.
As was noted above, services often don't flow across borders in the same way as goods flow. In recognition of this difference, a four-part classification system for services flows has developed and is generally accepted: 2 (1) cross-border; (2) consumption abroad;
(3) commercial presence; and (4) temporary presence (presence of natural persons). We expand on each category below.
1. Cross-border. Some services can and do actually originate in one country and "move" across a border to a user-recipient in another country. Examples include:
-electricity;
-telephone and similar telecommunications services;
-the transportation and logistics services that attach to the physical movement of goods in international trade;
-the transportation of people across borders;
-the sales services that attach to a sale (of goods or services) across borders;
-the provision of a loan, deposit, insurance, or other financial services product across a border;
-distance learning, whereby a student in one country takes a course (e.g., via the Internet) offered by an educational institution in another country.
2. Consumption abroad. Some services are consumed through the travel of the customer from one country to the provider in another country. Examples include:
-education abroad;
-repair services abroad;
-medical treatment abroad.
3. Commercial presence. For many services, the service is most effectively provided/sold to the customer through a local physical establishment in the country of the consumer. For example, though a loan could (in principle) be made by a bank that was located solely in country X to a borrower who was located solely in country Y (and thus be a "cross-border" transaction along the lines of #1 above), the bank's ability to assure itself that the borrower was a good risk who would be likely to repay the loan would usually be enhanced by the bank's having a local branch ("commercial presence") in country Y for interviewing and monitoring the borrower. As another example, a restaurant chain or a hotel chain in country X may believe that its services would be attractive also to customers in country Y, but few of the latter would be willing to travel to country X just for those services. In this case, the establishment of local outlets in country Y may be the only way for those services to be delivered.
More generally, examples of services providers through "commercial presence"
would include:
-banks and other financial services providers;
-restaurant chains;
-hotel chains;
-retail merchandise chains;
-accountancy branches;
-legal services branches.
Since "commercial presence" does require a physical presence, the provision of services through this channel will usually require investment in the host country from the services firm in its home country (i.e., foreign direct investment, or FDI). Also, home country personnel may need to travel to the location abroad (i.e., the host country) so as to initiate the operations, train local personnel, periodically monitor the operations, etc. Thus, this mode brings other international transactions --FDI and labor movement --with it. In turn, these additional international flows mean that there are more (and more subtle) opportunities for host countries to impede the flow of services from abroad through restrictions on FDI and restrictions on immigration, as well as through more direct limitations on commercial location and establishment itself.
4. Temporary presence (presence of natural persons). Some services may be best delivered through the temporary presence of an individual or a group of individuals who deliver the service while abroad. Examples include:
-visiting entertainers (e.g., visiting orchestras, theater companies, rock stars);
-temporary consultancies;
-short-term construction projects.
Again, because individuals from a home country must travel to a host country in order to deliver the service, immigration policy can become an indirect means of impeding the flow of the service.
B. Domestic regulation.
Services are often subject to extensive regulation by governments. As one illustration, consider the set of industries that were considered to be extensively regulated in the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s and that were the targets of major efforts at deregulation or regulatory reform during the last quarter of the twentieth century: All of these industries are services providers. Further, though this list is drawn from the U.S. experience, in other countries these same industries were either also heavily regulated or were under government ownership.
Though these industries are considerably less regulated today in the U.S. than they were three decades ago, a remnant of regulation --modest in some industries, still substantial in others --persists today. Similarly, in many other countries, the partial deregulation or privatization over the past few decades has meant that greater or lesser remnants of regulation persist.
For another broad category of services --e.g., professional services, such as medical services, legal services, accountancy services, architectural services, etc. --government regulation occurs through licensing boards (or through delegation to professional associations, with government oversight) that are intended to maintain quality standards, prevent fraud, and protect the public. In the late 1970s, however, as the U.S. began the deregulation of its domestic airline industry, the same commitment to greater competition (and the dawning realization that the U.S. had a comparative advantage) began manifesting itself internationally through U.S.
efforts to negotiate bilateral "open skies" arrangements to reduce the impediments that U.S.
airlines faced abroad. Further, the U.S. was also increasingly concerned about how other countries were treating the overseas branches of U.S. banks and how U.S. entertainment services, such as movies and syndicated television programs, were being treated. In addition, the European Common Market (ECM) was recognizing that the flows of various kinds of services, among its member countries and between the ECM and the rest of the world, was a major task that warranted substantial attention. In the early 1980s the U.S.
began a concerted effort to bring trade in services into the realm of multinational negotiation and bargaining. 4 See, for example, Lazear (2007) .
5 A more extensive treatment of the diplomatic history that eventually led to the GATS can be found in Nicolaidis (1989) .
During the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in the late 1980s and the early 1990s there was a more general international realization that trade in services needed to be brought into a more formal multilateral negotiating arena. As a consequence, along with the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) itself as the successor to the organization that had administered the GATT, a general agreement on trade in services --the GATS --was negotiated, and the GATT and the GATS became parallel pillars of the newly formed WTO. 6 The GATS (with a Council on Trade in Services to administer it) came into effect on January 1, 1995.
The GATS is a broad set of principles that has the goal of encouraging freer trade in services among the WTO member countries. It applies to virtually all services, with the exception of government services that are non-commercial in nature (e.g., social insurance, public safety, national defense) and air traffic rights. It establishes general commitments toward most-favored nation (MFN) treatment, transparency in the domestic regulation of services, market access, and national treatment of services suppliers. It formally recognizes that services can be delivered through any of the four modes discussed above.
Unfortunately, the GATS is also riddled with loopholes and exceptions, which are the formal recognition in the GATS of the sensitivities and difficulties that come with many services sectors, especially those that are regulated along the lines discussed above. The most important loophole is that each country can choose which of its services sectors, through which mode, will be subject to the specific provisions of the GATS (and, implicitly, which will be exempt). Further, the leadership of the GATS and of the WTO, in deference to national sensitivities about domestic regulatory issues, have stressed the ability of governments to limit their commitments to removing barriers.
Actual progress in effecting reductions in services trade barriers --because of all of the sensitivities to regulatory issues --has been slow. 8 The GATS has been in existence for about twelve years. After an initial set of statements and commitments at its inception, the "serious" negotiations were supposed to occur after 2000 in what has come to be called the Doha Round, with the negotiated reductions to be put in place at the end of the Round.
Unfortunately, the Doha Round fell apart in July 2006 over a range of issues, and it is unclear what will happen next and also unclear whether any negotiated reductions will actually occur.
Further, the structure of the GATS and its substantial deference to domestic regulation has created a seemingly inherent bias toward inaction. 9 The efforts aimed at reducing barriers to trade in accountancy services are a good example. 10 Early in its existence the Council on Trade in Services chose accountancy as a lead sector (among the heavily regulated professional services sectors) for more detailed and extensive negotiations aimed at reducing trade barriers, because accountancy already had substantial international presences through the international expansions of a (literal) handful of large accountancy firms. In 1998 the Council adopted "disciplines" (rules) on the domestic regulation of accountancy that were intended to provide greater detail on issues of transparency, licensing requirements and procedures, qualification requirements and procedures, and technical standards. The disciplines were not to come into force, however, until the conclusion of the Doha Round (which has fallen apart). When the GATS announced a "Workshop on Domestic Regulation" that was to be held on March 29-30, 2004 , and highlighted accountancy, the most recent progress that it could cite in that area was the 1998 disciplines.
Excerpts from the "Abstract" and "Introduction" sections of two recent GATS Working Papers 11 provide excellent expressions of the exceedingly modest progress that has been achieved under the GATS:
"...Members have more scope than under the GATT to depart from common horizontal obligations, in particular the MFN principle; they are able to adjust the breadth and depth of their trade commitments (market access and national treatment) to particular sector conditions; and they face less constraints, if any, in the use of trade-related policies such as subsidies, export restrictions, or domestic regulatory interventions... [T] he basic (builtin) flexibility elements of the Agreement ... will, of course, persist... However, flexibility may come at a cost: lack of meaningful obligations across a reasonably broad range of service sectors. Vested interests may find it far easier than under the GATT to defend their privileges and defy more rational and harmonized trading conditions... (Adlung, 2004, p. 1) "The ... absence of major problems [within the GATS] to date may be attributed to at least three factors:... Second, the lack of stringent, nonmodifiable trade obligations. There are virtually no requirements that individual Members might find difficult to meet or, otherwise, elude under relevant exemptions. The GATS offers more scope for departures from most-favored-nations (MFN) treatment --one of the few horizontal obligations that apply across virtually all services --than is the case under relevant GATT Articles. Moreover, traditional building blocks of the GATT, including the prohibition of quantitative restrictions and the automatic guarantee of national treatment with regard to domestic rules and regulations, are negotiable under the GATS..." (Adlung, 2004, p. 2) "Over the past months, it has become increasingly clear that the services negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda will not produce significant improvements on current commitments unless major new impetus is provided... [T]his paper discusses various impediments, from the perspective of the participating governments, that may explain the lack of negotiating momentum to date..." (Adlung and Roy, 2005, p. 2) "The services commitments that resulted from the Uruguay Round (1986-1993/94) , the first such round to cover trade in services as well, apparently have not had significant liberalization effects. Barring a few exceptions in basic telecommunications and financial services, where negotiations continued until February and December 1997, respectively, the commitments inscribed in Members' schedules remained essentially confined to binding existing regimes in a limited number of sectors. Further, many commitments may have been overtaken by autonomous liberalization moves in individual countries... This paper seeks to explore why commitments under the GATS have generally remained modest..." (Adlung and Roy, 2005, p. 3) III. Some Data A priori, one would expect to see rising levels of international trade in services, for at least five reasons. First, services generally appear to have an income elasticity of demand that is substantially greater than 1.0, especially in developed economies. As developed countries grow, they tend to produce and consume more-than-proportionately greater levels of services. To the extent that any services can cross borders, we would expect the growing demand for services to affect these cross-border services as well, which would be captured in economic statistics as growth in international trade in services.
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Second, the technologies --telecommunications, data processing and digitization, transportation, biological sciences --that underlie many important categories of services have experienced rapid improvements in the past few decades.
13 As a consequence, better quality services, with greater variations and variety, can be offered by more firms at lower costs over longer distances; more effective competition among providers follows. The real prices (quality-adjusted and inflation-adjusted) of many services has surely decreased, which reinforces the income-elasticity effects to encourage greater consumption of services.
And, again, some of this greater consumption should spill over to international trade in services.
Third, the improvements in telecommunications, data processing, and transportation technologies have also allowed firms to operate effectively over longer geographic distances and thus to allow services providers (such as hotel and restaurant chains) that require a commercial presence to be able to expand their reach and offerings.
Fourth, digitization of various kinds of information --e.g., credit scores of potential borrowers, the X-rays of medical patients, etc. --and reduced telecommunications costs have permitted some services (credit assessment, X-ray reading) that were previously vertically integrated with the final service (making a loan, health care) to be "outsourced".
With low-cost telecommunications extending internationally, the outsourced services can become "offshored" internationally traded services.
14 Finally, to the extent that countries have reduced their barriers to trade in services, those reductions too should encourage greater growth.
As we will see, the data strongly support these predictions. We will first present briefly some world trade data and then some more extensive U.S. data.
A. World data. Table 1 shows the experience of the world trading system for the past quarter century for goods and services. Consistent with the brief discussion above, trade in services has grown substantially: faster than trade in goods, and faster than the growth in world GDP.
It is worth noting that these data exclude the "commercial presence" mode (mode #3 above) of services exports, which has probably grown even faster (at least as is indicated by the U.S. data that are discussed below). Table 2 shows the identity of the leading exporters and importers of goods and services, as of 2005. As would be expected, the world's largest economies are the world's leading traders as well, with the U.S. holding first place in three of the four categories and second in the fourth.
B. U.S. data. Table 3 shows the experience specifically of the U.S. over this same quarter century.
Again, consistent with the discussion above, trade in services has grown substantially: faster than trade in goods and faster than U.S. GDP, as well as faster than world trade in services.
14 For further discussions along these lines, see Mann (2005) , Jensen and Kletzer (2006) , Van Welsum and Reif (2006) , and (more generally) Collins and Brainard (2006) . Table 4 provides the year-by-year annual trade data for goods and services for 1992-2005. As can be readily seen, trade in services has maintained a consistent annual surplus, while the annual deficit in trade in goods has grown progressively larger. Travel (i.e., tourism) has shown modest growth rates on both the export and import sides.
Passenger fares (largely airline fares plus cruise lines) showed slow growth in exports but much larger growth in imports. Other transportation (i.e., ocean shipping, air freight, ocean port services, and airport services) showed faster growth of imports than of exports.
Royalties and license fees (mostly fees paid to affiliates for intellectual property, plus fees paid for broadcasting international sports events) grew substantially, especially on the import side. Other private services (including education; financial services; insurance; telecommunications; film and television tape rentals; and business, professional, and technical services) grew rapidly; 16 finally, U.S. military and other government services grew at slow to medium rates.
Finally, Table 6 shows the annual data for 1992-2005 for sales of services through nonbank affiliates --in essence, sales of services through a commercial presence (mode #3 discussed above). As can be seen, the flows in both directions grew faster than did the services flows shown in Table 4 . Further, sales by foreign affiliates of U.S. companies to non-U.S. persons grew faster than the sales by the U.S. affiliates of foreign companies to U.S. persons, and the net balance was a growing and sizable surplus. It is also worth noting that for recent years the absolute sizes of the services sales in each direction have been larger than the counterpart services exports and imports listed in Table 4 , and the annual surpluses 15 Greater detail and discussion can be found in Koncz et al. (2006) and USITC (2006) . 16 The persistent annual surpluses in this category are prominently noted in USCEA (2005, pp. 178-179) .
for 2003 and 2004 in Table 6 are also larger than the services surpluses in Table 4 for the same years.
IV. Opportunities for Reductions in Trade Barriers
A. The general landscape.
The U.S. economy --with some notable exceptions --is generally open to non-U.S.
providers of services through any of the four modes. 17 Even in relatively open areas, however, there are some subtle problems.
Financial services provide a good example. Second, in the area of housing finance, the U.S. has chartered three large "government-sponsored enterprises" (GSEs) --Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System --that are private companies with special privileges and advantages. 21 The most important advantage is the reduced borrowing costs that these GSEs enjoy as a consequence of their GSE status and the financial markets' perception that the U.S. Government would likely "bail them out" and thus make their creditors whole in 17 See the discussions in Brewer and Young (2001) , Mann (2005) , WTO (2006b) and USITC (2006) . 18 See, for example, the data and discussion in White (2002a) . 19 Insurance is an exception, in that it is regulated solely by the states. 20 Further discussion on this point can be found in USITC (2002, ch. 5) and WTO (2006b) . 21 Further discussion of these GSEs can be found, for example, in Frame and Wall (2002) , Frame (2003) , White (2003 White ( , 2004 , White (2004, 2005) , and Frame and Flannery (2006) . There are four major areas for which there are notable restrictions on trade in services in the U.S.: air transport; water transport; truck transport; and satellite broadcasting spectrum licenses. We will discuss each in turn. Act of 1958, any company that provides point-to-point passenger or freight air service within the U.S. ("cabotage") must be a U.S. carrier. This means that the company must be under the actual control of U.S. citizens, and foreign ownership is limited to a maximum of 25% of voting shares. Also, the president and at least two-thirds of the board of directors and other managing officers must be U.S. citizens. The crews of a U.S. carrier must be U.S. citizens or resident aliens.
All of these requirements have effectively prevented foreign carriers from offering domestic service in the U.S.
In addition, the Fly America Act of 1974 requires that U.S. government-financed international transportation of passengers and cargo be on a U.S.-flag carrier (although exceptions are possible). 25 In the late summer of 2006 new legislation was passed that was intended to loosen the SEC's restrictions on entry into the bond rating business. Whether that intent will be converted into actuality will be determined by how the SEC drafts and implements the new regulations that are required by the legislation. For further discussion, see White (2007) . 26 Extensive discussions of these restrictions and their consequences can be found in USITC (1999, ch. 5; 2002, ch. 5; 2004, ch. 5) 2. Water transport. The Jones Act of 1920 restricts the domestic point-to-point transport of cargo to ships that are registered and built in the U.S., on which at least 75% of the employees are U.S. citizens, and that are owned by a U.S. corporation. Domestic passenger service (essentially, cruise lines) must meet similar requirements under the Passenger Vessel Services Act of 1886. Though foreign companies could, in principle, establish a shipping company in the U.S. through a holding company arrangement, the other requirements have effectively discouraged such actions, and U.S. water-borne cabotage is a U.S. preserve.
In addition, various pieces of legislation require that 50%-100% (depending on the category) of "government-impelled" international cargoes --such as military cargo, oil for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and foreign aid cargo --be carried in U.S.-flag ships (that are built in the U.S., on which at least 75% of the employees are U.S. citizens, and that are owned by a U.S. corporation). Despite these restrictions, 98% of U.S. international waterborne cargo travels in non-U.S. flag ships. Nevertheless, the restrictions on the remaining 2% are effectively a restraint on trade.
3. Truck transport. Realistically, the import of trucking services is likely to occur largely from Canada and Mexico. Neither country's trucks are permitted to provide domestic point-to-point freight service within the U.S.; 27 thus, yet another category of cabotage is reserved for U.S. firms.
The use of foreign-owned trucks for the delivery of international cargo to points within the U.S. is a separate, and important, category of concern. About 70% of goods imports from Canada enter the U.S. by truck; the comparable figure for goods imports by truck from Mexico is over 80%.
27 A modest exception is available to Canadian trucks that are delivering or picking up international cargoes in the U.S.; they can transport goods between points within the U.S., so long as the local shipment is incidental to an immediately prior or subsequent international trip. However, the Communications Act also restricts foreign ownership of one-way satellite transmissions of direct-to-home (DTH), direct broadcasting systems (DBS), and digital audio services, and the holding company work-around does not appear to be available to undo this restriction.
C. The opportunities and the challenges.
As is true in other areas of international trade, the U.S. Government's position with respect to trade in services is a mixture of export boosterism and import protectionism. On the one hand, in areas in which the U.S. has a comparative advantage --such as international airline services, financial services, and entertainment services --the U.S. has been actively promoting "open skies" and its financial and entertainment equivalents. On the other hand, in areas where the U.S. has a comparative disadvantage, such as ocean shipping, or where important national interests are seen to be at stake, such as domestic airline service or satellite services, the U.S. remains protectionist.
This bifurcation in perspective is largely typical of the mercantilist perspective that continues to dominate national policy-making: Exports are good; imports are bad; "jobs" saved and created are all-important; we will (maybe) lower our trade barriers only if you promise to lower yours; etc. It pervades the U.S. policy perspective with respect to trade in goods. There's no reason to expect that it wouldn't pervade trade in services as well.
It is clear that there would be net gains in U.S. social welfare if the major restrictions identified above were relaxed, even unilaterally. 28 Further, because the U.S. has a comparative advantage in many important services --e.g., airline services, educational services, financial services, entertainment services, etc. --the U.S. economy could also gain from reductions in services trade barriers abroad. These latter reductions could well require, as a quid pro quo, the reductions in the major U.S. barriers. However, the reduction or removal of these major restrictions --which would require contentious legislation 29 --do not seem to be "on the table" for discussion and negotiation.
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There are two other trade-in-services issues that are of concern. First, as a consequence of the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. clearly tightened its immigration procedures, which must make it harder for foreign services providers to maintain their efforts in the U.S. Substantial levels of illegal immigration into the U.S. have generated 28 The "national defense" argument for retaining these restrictions on domestic air service and waterborne trade are weak, at best, and the goals could be achieved at lesser social costs through various contingent contracting arrangements by the U.S. Department of Defense. The "highway safety" arguments that are used to justify the restrictions on Mexican trucking in the U.S. are similarly weak. 29 Beginning in late 2005 the U.S. Department of Transportation explored the possibility that it could (through a liberal interpretation of the relevant legislation) find a way around the foreign ownership restrictions on domestic airline service (so as to accommodate the possibility of the Virgin Group's establishing domestic service) but ultimately abandoned the effort in December 2006. 30 In its initial policy statement that was preliminary to the WTO's 2006 "Trade Policy Review", the U.S. did not mention any of its major services trade restrictions. See WTO (2006a) . calls for a general reform of immigration policy. There are always dangers that changes in immigration policy could further restrict the inflow of foreign workers, with unfortunate consequences for trade in services.
Second, there has been a rising level of political attention to the offshore outsourcing of some services, such as telephone call centers, backoffice data processing, software development, and other information technology functions. This outsourcing has grown as a consequence of decreasing telecommunications and data processing costs and the generally increasing scope, breadth, and quality of digitization technologies. 31 Fortunately, this greater political attention has not (yet) been translated into any restrictive actions or policies.
But the possibility of restrictions surely continues as a worrisome threat to freer trade in these services. 31 See Mann (2005) and Van Welsum and Reif (2006) .
V. Conclusion
Trade in services is a growing and worthwhile area for the U.S. and the world.
Though the U.S. is a comparatively open economy with respect to trade in services (as well as trade in goods), there are some major restrictions that are worthy of relaxation, as well as some more subtle problems. Further, since the U.S. has a comparative advantage in a number of major services areas, the U.S. economy would benefit from the relaxation of restrictions abroad. Finally, policy concerns about immigration (which is essential for many forms of trade in services) and about the offshore outsourcing of some services could lead to new restrictions, with unfortunate consequences for trade in services.
Though the long-run trends of reduced restrictions on and expanded flows of trade in services have been favorable and probably will continue to be so, the attractiveness of protectionism and mercantilism should never be underestimated. Wary optimism and watchful readiness may well be the best attitudes for those who care about maintaining and open environment for trade in services. 
